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Abstract—Since 2016, sharding has become an auspicious
solution to tackle the scalability issue in legacy blockchain
systems. Despite its potential to strongly boost the blockchain
throughput, sharding comes with its own security issues. To
ease the process of deciding which shard to place transactions,
existing sharding protocols use a hash-based transaction sharding
in which the hash value of a transaction determines its output
shard. Unfortunately, we show that this mechanism opens up a
loophole that could be exploited to conduct a single-shard flooding
attack, a type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, to overwhelm a
single shard that ends up reducing the performance of the system
as a whole.
To counter the single-shard flooding attack, we propose
a countermeasure that essentially eliminates the loophole by
rejecting the use of hash-based transaction sharding. The counter-
measure leverages the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to
let blockchain’s validators securely execute a transaction sharding
algorithm with a negligible overhead. We provide a formal specifi-
cation for the countermeasure and analyze its security properties
in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Finally, a
proof-of-concept is developed to demonstrate the feasibility and
practicality of our solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharding, an auspicious solution to tackle the scalability
issue of blockchain, has become one of the most trending
research topics and been intensively studied in recent years
[1]–[5]. In the context of blockchain, sharding is the approach
of partitioning the set of nodes (or validators) into multiple
smaller groups of nodes, called shard, that operate in par-
allel on disjoint sets of transactions and maintain disjoint
ledgers. By parallelizing the consensus work and storage,
sharding reduces drastically the storage, computation, and
communication costs that are placed on a single node, thereby
scaling the system throughput proportionally to the number of
shards. Previous studies [2], [3], [5] show that sharding could
potentially improve blockchain’s throughput to thousands of
transactions per second (whereas current Bitcoin system only
handles up to 7 transactions per second and requires 60 minutes
confirmation time for each transaction).
Despite the incredible results in improving the scalability,
blockchain sharding is still vulnerable to some severe security
problems. The root of those problems is that, with partitioning,
the honest majority of mining power or stake share is dispersed
into individual shards. This significantly reduces the size of
honest majority in each shard, which in turn dramatically
lowering the attack bar on a specific shard. Hence, a blockchain
sharding system must have some mechanisms to prevent adver-
saries from gaining the majority of validators of a single shard,
this is commonly referred as single-shard takeover attack [6].
In this paper, we take a novel approach by exploiting
the inter-shard consensus to identify a new vulnerability of
blockchain sharding. One intrinsic attribute of blockchain
sharding is the existence of cross-shard transactions that,
simply speaking, are transactions that involve multiple shards.
These transactions require the involved shards to perform
an inter-shard consensus mechanism to confirm the validity.
Hence, intuitively, if we could perform a Denial-of-Server
(DoS) attack to one shard, it would also affect the performance
of other shards via the cross-shard transactions. Furthermore,
both theoretical and empirical analysis [2], [5] show that most
existing sharding protocols have 99% cross-shard transactions.
This implies that attack on one shard could potentially impact
the performance of the entire blockchain. In addition, with
this type of attacks, the attacker is a client of the blockchain
system, hence, this attack can be conducted even when we can
guarantee the honest majority in every shard.
Although existing work does have some variants of flood-
ing attack that try to overwhelm the entire blockchain by
having the attacker generate a superfluous amount of dust
transactions, however, it is unclear how we could conduct this
attack in a sharding system. In fact, we emphasize that a con-
ventional transactions flooding attack on the entire blockchain
(as opposed to a single shard) would not be effective for two
reasons. First, blockchain sharding has high throughput, hence,
the cost of attack would be enormous to generate a huge
amount of dust transactions that is sufficiently much greater
than the system throughput. Second, and more importantly,
since the sharding system scales with the number of shards,
it can easily tolerate such attacks by adding more shards to
increase throughput.
To bridge this gap, we propose a single-shard flooding
attack to exploit the DoS vulnerability of blockchain sharding.
Instead of overwhelming the entire blockchain, an attacker
would strategically place a tremendous amount of transactions
into one single shard in order to reduce the performance of
that shard, as the throughput of one shard is not scalable.
The essence of our attack comes from the fact that most
sharding proposals use hash-based transaction sharding [1]–
[3]: a transaction’s hash value is used to determine which
shard to place the transaction (i.e., output shard). Since that
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hash value (e.g., SHA-256) of a transaction is indistinguishable
from that of a random function, this mechanism can efficiently
distribute the transactions evenly among the shards and thus
widely adopted. Therefore, an attacker can manipulate the hash
to generate an excessive amount of transactions to one shard.
As we argue that using hash values to determine the
output shard is not secure, we propose a countermeasure to
efficiently eliminate the attack for the sharding system. By
not using the transaction’s hash value or any other attributes
of the transaction, we can delegate the task of determining
the output shard to the validators, then the adversary cannot
carry out this DoS attack. However, this raises two main
challenges: (1) what basis can be used to determine the output
shard of a transaction, and (2) how honest validators can
agree on the output of (1). For the first challenge, we need a
transaction sharding algorithm to decide the output shard for
each transaction. OptChain [5] is an example algorithm where
it aims to minimize the number of cross-shard transaction
and also balance the load among the shard. For the second
challenge, a naive solution is to have the validators reach
on-chain consensus on the output shard of every transaction.
However, that would be very costly and reject the main concept
of sharding, that is, each validator only processes a subset of
transactions to parallelize the consensus work and storage.
To overcome the aforementioned challenge, we establish
a system for executing the transaction sharding algorithm
off-chain and attesting the correctness of the execution. As
blockchain validators are untrusted, we need to guarantee
that the execution of the transaction sharding algorithm is
tamper-proof. To accomplish this, we leverage the Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) to isolate the execution of the
algorithm inside a TEE module, shielding it from potentially
malicious hosts. With this approach, we are not imposing any
significant on-chain computation overhead as compared to the
hash-based transaction sharding and also maintain the security
properties of blockchain. Moreover, this solution can be easily
integrated into existing blockchain sharding proposals, and as
modern Intel CPUs from 2014 support TEE, the proposed
countermeasure is compatible with current blockchain systems.
Contribution. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We identify a new attack on blockchain sharding that
exploits the loophole of using hash-based transaction
sharing, namely single-shard flooding attack.
• To evaluate the potential impact of this attack on
the blockchain system, we develop a discrete-event
simulator for blockchain sharding that can be used
to observe how sharding performance changes when
the system is under attacked. Not only for our attack
analysis purposes, this simulator can also assist the
research community in evaluating the performance of
a sharding system without having to set up multiple
computing nodes.
• We propose a countermeasure to the single-shard
flooding attack by executing transaction sharding al-
gorithms using TEE. In specific, we provide a formal
specification of the system and formally analyze its
security properties in the Universal Composability
(UC) framework with a strong adversarial model.
• To validate our proposed countermeasure, we develop
a proof-of-concept implementation of the system and
provide a performance analysis to demonstrate its
feasibility.
Organization. The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. Some background and related work are summarized
in Section II. Section III describes in detail the single-shard
flooding attack with some preliminary analysis to demonstrate
its practicality. In Section IV, we present the construction of
our simulator and conduct some experiments to demonstrate
the damage of the attack. The countermeasure is discussed in
Section V with a formal specification of the system. Section VI
gives a security analysis of the countermeasure along with a
performance evaluation on the proof-of-concept implementa-
tion. Finally, Section VII concludes our paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we establish some background on the
blockchain sharding as well as examine some prior work that
is related to ours.
Blockchain sharding. Several solutions [1]–[6] suggest
partitioning the blockchain into shards to address the scal-
ability issue in blockchain. Typically, with sharding, the
blockchain’s state is divided into multiple shards, each has
their own independent state and transactions and is managed
by the shard’s validators. By having multiple shards where
each of them processes a disjoint set of transactions, the
computation power is parallelized and sharding in turn helps
boost the system throughput with respect to the number of
shards. With the exception of Ethereum sharding [6], most of
existing sharding protocols are developed on top of Bitcoin
blockchain. Some main challenges of a sharding protocol
include (1) how to securely assign validators to shards, (2)
intra-shard consensus, (3) assigning transactions to shards, and
(4) processing cross-shard transactions. Our proposed attack
exploits the third and fourth challenges of sharding that deal
with transactions in a sharding system.
In a simple manner, a transaction is cross-shard if it
requires confirmations from more than one shard. In the
Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) model used by Bitcoin
[7], each transaction has multiple outputs and inputs where an
output dictates the amount of money that is sent to a Bitcoin
address. Each of the outputs can be used as an input to another
transaction. To prevent double-spending, an output can be used
only once. Denote tx as a transaction with two inputs tx1 and
tx2, this means tx uses one or more outputs from transaction
tx1 and tx2. Let S1, S2, and S3 be the shards containing
tx1, tx2, and tx, respectively, we refer S1 and S2 as the input
shards of tx, and S3 as the output shard. If these three shards
are the same, tx is an in-shard transaction, otherwise tx is
cross-shard.
To determine the output shard of a transaction, most
sharding protocols use the hash value of the transaction to
calculate the id of the output shard. By leveraging the hash
value, the transactions are effectively assigned to shards in a
uniformly random manner. However, in this work, we shall
show that this mechanism can be manipulated to perform a
DoS attack.
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Fig. 1. Processing cross-shard transaction tx. tx has input shards S1, S2,
and output shard S3. tx has to wait to be confirmed in the input shards before
it can be validated in the output shard
To process cross-shard transactions, several cross-shard
validation mechanisms have been proposed [2]–[4]. A cross-
shard validation mechanism determines how input and output
shards can coordinate to validate a cross-shard transaction.
This makes the process of validating cross-shard transactions
particularly expensive since the transaction must wait for
confirmations from all of its input shard before it can be
validated in the output shard. Fig. 1 illustrates this process. Our
attack takes advantage of this mechanism to cause a cascading
effect that creates a negative impact on shards that are not
being attacked.
Flooding attacks. Over the years, we have observed the
economic impact of this attack as Bitcoin has been flooded
multiple times with dust transactions by malicious users to
make legitimate users pay higher mining fees. In November
of 2017, the Bitcoin mempool size exceeded 115,000 uncon-
firmed transactions, the value of these unconfirmed transac-
tions sum up to 110,611 BTC, worth over 900 million US
dollars, weighting about 36 MB [8]. In June 2018, the Bitcoin’s
mempool was flooded with 4500 unconfirmed dust transactions
which eventually increased the mempool size to 45MB. As
a result, the mining fee was greatly increased and it caused
legitimate users to pay higher fee to get their transactions
confirmed [9]. Therefore, it is extremely critical to study this
attack rigorously.
There exists some variants of flooding attack that aim to
overwhelm an entire blockchain system [10], [11], not a single
shard. The main concept of the attack is to send a huge amount
of transactions to overwhelm the mempool, fill blocks to their
maximum size, and effectively delay other transactions. In a
typical blockchain system, unconfirmed transactions are stored
in the mempools managed by blockchain validators. In contrast
to the limited block size, the mempool size has no size limit.
This kind of attacks requires the attacker to flood the
blockchain system at a rate that is much greater than the
system throughput. Intuitively, such an attack is not effective
on a sharding system because its throughput is exceedingly
high. In fact, a simple solution to the flooding attack is to
add more shards to increase the overall throughput since the
system scales with the number of shards. In contrast, the
throughput of one shard is not scalable, thus, it would be more
reasonable to attack a single shard and make it become the
performance bottleneck of the whole system. In this paper,
we show how attackers can manipulate the transactionâA˘Z´s
hash to overwhelm a single shard, thereby damaging the entire
blockchain through cascading effects caused by cross-shard
transactions.
Blockchain on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
A key building block of our countermeasure is TEE. Memory
regions in TEE are transparently encrypted and integrity-
protected with keys that are only available to the processor.
TEE’s memory is also isolated by the CPU hardware from
the rest of the host’s system, including high-privilege system
software. Thus the operating system, hypervisor, and other
users cannot access the TEEâA˘Z´s memory. There have been
multiple available implementations of TEE including Intel
SGX [12], ARM TrustZone [13], and Keystone [14]. Intel SGX
also supports generating remote attestations that can be used
to prove the correct execution of a program running inside a
TEE.
There has been a recent growth in adopting TEEs to
improve blockchains [15]–[18], but not to sharding systems.
Teechain [16] proposes an improvement over off-chain pay-
ment network in Bitcoin using TEE to enable asynchronous
blockchain access. BITE [15] leverages TEE to further enhance
the privacy of Bitcoin’s client. In [17], [18], the authors de-
velop secure and efficient smart contract platforms on Bitcoin
and Ethereum, respectively, using TEE as a module to execute
the contract’s code.
We argue that TEE can be used to develop an efficient
countermeasure for the single-shard flooding attack in which
transaction sharding alogrithms can be securely executed inside
a TEE module. However, since existing solutions are designed
to address some very specific issues such as smart contracts
or payment network, applying them to blockchain sharding
systems are not straighforward.
III. SINGLE-SHARD FLOODING ATTACK
In this section, we describe our proposed single-shard
flooding attack on blockchain sharding starting with the threat
model and detail on performing the attack. Then, we present
some preliminary analysis of the attack to illustrate its potential
impact and practicality.
A. Threat Model
Attacker. We use Bitcoin-based sharding systems, such as
OmniLedger, RapidChain, and Elastico, as the attacker’s target.
We consider an attacker who is a client of the blockchain
system such that:
1) The attacker possesses an enough amount of Bitcoin
addresses to perform the attack. In practice, Bitcoin
addresses can be generated at no cost.
2) The attacker has spendable bitcoins in its wallet and
the balance is large enough to issue multiple trans-
actions between its addresses for this attack. Each of
the transactions is able to pay the minimum relay fee
minRelayTxFee. We will discuss the detail cost in
the next section.
3) The attacker is equipped with a software that is capa-
ble of generating transactions at a rate that is higher
than a shard’s throughput, which will be discussed in
the subsequent section.
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4) Since this is a type of DoS attack, to prevent from
being blocked by the blockchain network, the attacker
can originate the attack from multiple sources.
Goals of attacks. By employing the concept of flooding
attack, the main goal of the single-shard flooding attack is
to overwhelm a single shard by sending a huge amount of
transactions to that shard. The impact of this attack has been
widely studied on non-sharded blockchain like Bitcoin such
that it can reduce the system performance by delaying the
verification of legitimate transactions and eventually increase
the transaction fee.
Furthermore, with the concept of cross-shard transactions
where each transaction requires confirmation from multiple
shards, an attack to overwhelm one shard could affect the
performance of other shards and reduce the system’s per-
formance as a whole. For example, in Fig. 1, if S1 were
under attack, the transaction validation would also be delayed
in S3. Analysis from previous work [2] shows that placing
transactions using their hash value could result in 99.98% of
cross-shard transactions. Since the throughput of one shard
is limited, under our attack, it could effectively become the
performance bottleneck of the whole system. Therefore, to
make the most out of this scheme, the attacker would target
the shard that has the lowest throughput in the system.
How to perform attack. In most Bitcoin-based sharding
systems, such as OmniLedger, RapidChain, and Elastico, the
hash of a transaction determines which shard to put the
transaction. In specific, the ending bits of the hash value
indicate the output shard id. The main idea of our attack
is to have the attackers manipulate the transaction’s hash in
order to place it into the shard that they want to overwhelm.
To accomplish this, we conduct a brute-force generation of
transactions by alternating the output addresses of a transaction
until we find an appropriate hash value.
Let T be the target shard which the attacker wants to over-
whelm. We define a "malicious transaction" as a transaction
whose hash was manipulated to be put in shard T . Denote tx
as a transaction, tx.in is the set of input addresses, and tx.out
is the set of output addresses. We further denote O as the set of
attacker’s addresses, I ⊆ O as the set of attacker’s addresses
that are holding some bitcoins. Let H(·) be the SHA-256 hash
function (its output is indistinguishable from that of a random
function), Algorithm 1 describes how to generate a malicious
transaction in a system of 2N shards.
Starting with a raw transaction tx, the algorithm randomly
samples a set of input addresses for tx.in from I such that
the balance of those addresses is greater than the minimum
relay fee. It then randomly samples a set of output addresses
for tx.out from O and set the values for tx.out so that tx can
pay the minimum relay fee. The hash value of the transaction
is determined by double hashing the transaction’s data using
the SHA-256 function. It checks if the final N bits indicate
T (& denotes a bitwise AND), if that is true, it outputs the
malicious tx that will be placed into shard T . Otherwise, it
re-samples another set of output addresses for tx.out from O.
B. Preliminary Analysis
1) Capability of generating malicious transactions: In this
section, we demonstrate the practicality of the attack by assess-
Algorithm 1 Generate a malicious transaction
Input: I,O, N, T
Output: A malicious transaction tx
1: tx← raw transaction
2: tx.in
$←I
3: while H(H(tx)) & (1256−N ‖ 0N ) 6= T do
4: tx.out
$←O
5: Set values for tx.out to satisfy the minRelayTxFee.
6: end while
7: Ret tx
TABLE I. CAPABILITY OF GENERATING MALICIOUS TX WITH RESPECT
TO THE NUMBER OF SHARDS USING AN INTEL CORE I7 LAPTOP WITH 8
THREADS.
No. of shards No. of malicious tx per sec
2 823,512
4 412,543
8 205,978
16 103,246
32 52,361
64 26,939
ing the capability of generating malicious transactions on a real
machine. Suppose we have 2N shards and a transaction tx, that
means we will use N ending bits of H(tx) to determine its
shard. Suppose we want to put all transactions into shard 0, we
need to generate some malicious transactions tx such that the
last N bits of H(tx) must be 0. We calculate the probability of
generating a malicious transaction as follows. As a SHA-256
hash has 256 bits, the probability of generating a hash with N
ending zero bits will be 2
256−N
2256 =
1
2N
. Therefore, we expect to
obtain 1 malicious transaction per generating 2N transactions.
That means if we have 16 shards, we can obtain 1 malicious
transaction (i.e., the last 4 bits are zero) per generating 16
transactions.
To see the capability of generating malicious transactions,
we conduct an experiment on an 8th generation Intel Core
i7 laptop. The program to generate transactions is written in
C++ and run with 8 threads. When the number of shards is 64,
the program can generate up to 1,644,736 transaction hashes
per second, of which there are 26,939 malicious transactions
(8 ending bits are zero). In short, within 1 second, a laptop
can generate about 26,939 malicious transactions, which is
potentially much more than the throughput of one shard.
Table I shows the number of malicious transactions generated
per second with respect to the number of shards. Note that, in
practice, an attacker can easily produce much higher numbers
by using a more highly capable machine with faster CPU.
2) Cost of attacks: The default value of minRelayTxFee
in Bitcoin is 1,000 satoshi per kB, which is about $0.10 (as
of Feb 2020). Taking into account that the average transaction
size is 500 bytes, each transaction needs to pay $0.05 as the
minRelayTxFee. Our experiments below show that generat-
ing 2500 malicious transactions is enough to limit the through-
put of the whole system by that of the attacked shard. Hence,
the attacker needs about $125 to perform the attack effectively.
Furthermore, by paying the minimum relay fee without paying
the minimum transaction fee, the malicious transactions will
still be relayed to the attacked shard’s mempool but will not
be confirmed, thereby retaining the starting balance.
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Fig. 2. Affected transactions by the single-shard flooding attack
3) Cascading effect of the single-shard flooding attack:
We estimate the portion of transactions that are affected by
the attack. A transaction is affected if one of its input shards
or the output shard is the attacked shard. Considering a system
with n shards and transactions with m inputs, the probability
of a transaction to be affected by the attack is 1− (n−1n )m+1.
The result is illustrated in Fig. 2. As can be seen, a typical
transaction with 2 or 3 inputs has up to 70% chance of being
affected with 4 shards. However, with 16 shards about 20%
of the transactions are still affected. Note that this number
only represents the transactions that are "directly" affected
by the attack, the actual number is higher when considering
transactions that depends on the delayed transactions.
Even though the analysis shows that the number of affected
transactions is less at 16 shards than at 4 shards, in fact, the
attack does much more damage to the 16-shard system. The
intuition of this scenario is that as we increase the number
of shards, we also increase the number of input shards per
transaction. Since a transaction has to wait for the confirma-
tions from all of its input shards, an affected transaction in the
16-shard system takes more time to be validated than that in
the 4-shard system. The experiments in the next section will
illustrate this impact in more detail.
IV. ANALYZING THE ATTACK’S IMPACTS
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of our attack,
especially how it impacts the system performance as a whole.
Before that, we describe the design of our simulator that is
developed to analyze the performance of a blockchain sharding
system.
A. Simulator
Our implementation was based on SimBlock [19], a
discrete-event Bitcoin simulator that was designed to test the
performance of the Bitcoin network. SimBlock is able to
simulate the geographical distribution of Bitcoin nodes across
six regions (North America, South America, Europe, Asia,
Japan, Australia) of which the bandwidth and propagation
Fig. 3. UML class diagram of the simulator
delay are set to reproduce the actual behavior of the Bitcoin
network. Nevertheless, SimBlock fails to capture the role of
transactions in the simulation, which is an essential part in
evaluation the performance of blockchain sharding systems.
Our work improves SimBlock by taking into considera-
tion the Bitcoin transactions and simulating the behavior of
sharding. Fig. 3 shows a simple UML class diagram depicting
the relations between components of our simulator. As can be
seen later, our simulator can be easily used to evaluate the
performance of any existing or future sharding protocols.
1) Transactions: The sole purpose of SimBlock was only
to show the block propagation so the authors did not consider
transactions. To represent Bitcoin transactions, we adopt the
Transaction-as-Nodes (TaN) network proposed in [5]. Each
transaction is abstracted as a node in the TaN network, there
is a directed edge (u, v) if transaction u uses transaction v
as an input. In our simulator, each transaction is an instance
of a Transaction class and can be directly obtained from the
Bitcoin dataset. At the beginning of the simulation, a Client
instance loads each transaction from the dataset and sends
them to the network to be confirmed by Nodes. Depending
on the transaction sharding algorithm, each transaction could
be associated with one or more shards.
Furthermore, our simulator can also emulate real Bitcoin
transactions in case we need more transactions than what
we have in the dataset or we want to test the system with
different set of transactions. With regard to sharding, the two
important factors of a transaction are the degree and the input
shards. From the Bitcoin dataset of more than 300 million
real Bitcoin transactions, we fit the degree distribution with
a power-law function as in Fig. 4 (black dots are the data,
the blue line is the resulted power-law function). The resulting
function is y = 106.7x−2.3. Fig. 5 shows the number of input
shards with 16 shards (using hash-based transaction sharding)
that is also fitted with a power-law function. The resulting
function is y = 107.2x−2.2. Hence, the Client can use these
distributions to sample the degree and input shards when
generating transactions that resemble the distribution of the
real dataset.
2) Sharding: After the simulator generates Node instances,
each of them is distributed into an instance of Shard. All
nodes in a shard share the same ledger and a mempool
of unconfirmed/pending transactions. In the class Node, we
implement a cross-shard validation algorithm that decides how
nodes in different shards can communicate and confirm cross-
shard transactions. In the current implementation, we use the
mechanism proposed in [3] to process cross-shard transactions.
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Fig. 4. Degree distribution of the Bitcoin transactions. The black dots are
the data, the blue line shows a fitted power-law y = 106.7x−2.3.
Fig. 5. Distribution of Bitcoin transactions’ number of input shards. The black
dots are the data, the blue line shows a fitted power-law y = 107.2x−2.2.
For each Node instance, upon receiving a transaction, it
will relay the transaction to the destination shard. When the
transaction reaches the shard, it will be stored in the mempool
of the Node instances in that shard. Each transaction in the
mempool is then validated using an intra-shard consensus
protocol.
3) Use cases of the simulator: Besides being used to test
the impact of our proposed attack, researchers can also use the
simulator to evaluate the performance of multiple blockchain
sharding systems. By far, most experiments on blockchain
sharding have to be run on numerous rented virtual machines
[1]–[4], this is notably costly and complicated to set up.
Without having to build the whole blockchain system, our
simulator is particularly useful when researchers need to test
various algorithms and system configurations on blockchain
long before deploying the real system.
By using simulation, various setups can be easily evaluated
and compared, thereby making it possible to recognize and
resolve problems without the need of performing potentially
expensive field tests. By exploiting a pluggable design, the
simulator can be easily reconfigured to work with different
algorithms on transaction sharding, cross-shard validation,
validators assignment, and intra-shard consensus protocol.
B. Experimental Evaluations
Our experiments are conducted on 10 million real Bitcoin
transactions by injecting them into the simulator at some
fixed rates. We generate 4000 validator nodes and randomly
Fig. 6. Impact on system throughput
distribute them into shards. In the current Bitcoin setting, the
block size limit is 1 MB, the average size of a transaction
is 500 bytes, hence, each block contains approximately 2000
transactions. We evaluate the system performance with 4, 8,
12, and 16 shards, which are the number of shards that were
used in previous studies [2], [3], [5].
1) Throughput: The experiment in this section illustrates
how malicious transactions affect the system throughput. In
order to find out the best throughput of the system, we
gradually increase the transactions rate (i.e., the rate at which
transactions are injected to the system) and observe the final
throughput until the throughput stops increasing. At 16 shards,
the best throughput is about 4000 tps, which is achieved when
the transactions rate is about 5000 tps. For this experiment,
we fix the transactions rate at 5000 tps so that the system is
always at its best throughput with respect to the number of
shards.
To perform the attack, the attacker runs Algorithm 1 to
generate some portions of malicious transactions into shard 0.
For example, if 10% of transactions are malicious, then at each
second, 500 transactions will be put into shard 0, the rest 4500
txs are distributed into shards according to their hash value.
The results are shown in the Fig. 6.
At 0%, the system is not under attack, the system achieves
its best throughput with respect to the number of shards.
The horizontal dashed line illustrates the throughput of 1
shard, which is the lower bound of the system throughput.
As can be seen, when we increase the number of malicious
transactions, the system throughput rapidly decreases. This
behavior can be explained as we have multiple cross-shard
transactions that associate with the attacked shard, their delays
could produce a severe cascading effect that end up hampering
the performance of other shards. Thus, the throughput as a
whole is diminished. Moreover, we can observe that higher
numbers of shards are more vulnerable to the attack. With 16
shards, the performance reduce exponentially as we increase
the portion of malicious transactions to 50%. Specifically, with
only 20% malicious transactions, the throughput was reduced
by more than half. This behaviour essentially confirms our
prior preliminary analysis.
Another interesting observation is that at 50% malicious
transactions, the throughput nearly reaches its lower bound,
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Fig. 7. Impact on system latency
hence, the sharding system would not be any faster than using
only 1 shard. At this time, the attacker has accomplished its
goal, that is, making the attacked shard the bottleneck of
the whole system. 50% malicious transactions translates to
2500 malicious transactions are sent to the system at each
second, previous experiments and analysis in Table I show
that a normal laptop could easily generate more than 100,000
malicious transactions per second.
2) Latency: In this experiment, we analyze the impact of
the single-shard flooding attack on the system latency, which
is the average amount of time needed to validate a transaction.
To avoid backlog when the system is not under attack, for each
number of shards, the transactions rate is set to match the best
system throughput. The results are shown in the Fig. 7. In the
same manner as the previous experiment, the attack effectively
increases the latency of the system as a whole. We shall see
in the next experiment that the attack creates serious backlog
in the mempool of the shards, thereby increasing the waiting
time of transactions and eventually raising the average latency.
This experiment also corroborates the experiment on sys-
tem throughput as greater numbers of shards are also more
vulnerable to the attack. With 16 shards, although it provides
the fastest transaction processing when the system is not under
attack, nevertheless, it becomes the slowest one even with only
10% of malicious transactions. Additionally, when the attacker
generates 20% malicious transactions, the latency is increased
by more than 10 times. Therefore, we can conclude that
although adding more shards would help improve the system
performance, under our attack, the system would become more
vulnerable.
3) Queue/Mempool size: In the following experiments, we
investigate the impact of this single-shard flooding attack
on the queue (or mempool) size of shard 0, which is the
shard that is under attack. This gives us insights on how
malicious transactions cause backlog in the shard. Firstly, we
fix the number of shards and vary the portion of malicious
transactions. Fig. 8 illustrates the queue size over time of
shard 0 with a system of 16 shards where each line represents
the portion of malicious transactions. When the system is not
under attack, the queue size is stable with less than 15,000
transactions at any point in time. As we put in only 10%
malicious transactions, the queue size reaches more than 2
million transactions.
Fig. 8. Impact on the attacked shard’s queue size at 16 shards
Fig. 9. Impact on the attacked shard’s queue size with 20% malicious
transactions
Note that under our attack, the transactions are injected into
shard 0 as a rate that is much higher than its throughput, thus,
the queue will keep on increasing until all transactions have
been injected. At this point, transactions are no longer added
to the shard and the shard is still processing transactions from
the queue, hence, the queue size decreases. This explains why
the lines (i.e., queue size) go down towards the end of the
simulation.
The result also demonstrates that the congestion gets worse
as we increase the malicious transactions. Due to the extreme
backlog, transactions have to wait in the mempool for a sig-
nificant amount of time, thereby increasing their waiting time.
This explains the negative impact of malicious transactions on
system throughput and latency.
Next, we observe the queue size with different number
of shards. Fig. 9 presents the impact of the attack with 20%
malicious transactions at different number of shards. As can be
seen, when we increase the number of shards, the backlog of
transactions builds up much faster and greater due to the fact
that we are having more cross-shard transactions. This result
conforms our previous claim that greater numbers of shards
are more vulnerable to the attack.
4) Summary: The experiments presented in this section
have shown that our attack effectively reduce the performance
of the whole system by attacking only a single shard. By
generating malicious transactions according to Algorithm 1,
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the attacker easily achieves its goal of limiting the system
performance to the throughput of one shard. Our preliminary
analysis in Section III-B shows that the attacker is totally
capable of generating an excessive amount of malicious trans-
actions at low cost, thereby demonstrating the practicality of
the attack.
V. COUNTERMEASURE
As we have argued that using hash values to determine the
output shards is susceptible to the single-shard flooding attack,
we delegate the task of determining the output shards without
using hash values to the validators. To achieve that task, we
consider the validators running a deterministic transactions
sharding algorithm. The program takes the form of Sout =
txsharding(tx, st) in which it ingests as inputs a blockchain
state st and the transaction tx, and generates the output shard
id Sout of tx calculated at state st. Moreover, the algorithm
txsharding is made public. The minimum requirement for an
efficient txsharding is that it has to have a load-balancing
mechanism to balance the load among the shards. Finally, we
assume that txsharding does not use a transaction’s hash as
the basis for determining its output shard. At this time of
writing, OptChain [5] is a suitable algorithm for txsharding.
However, by the nature of blockchain, the validators are
untrusted. A straw-man approach is to run txsharding on-
chain and let the validators reach consensus on the output
of txsharding. Hence, the validators would have to reach
consensus on every single transaction. Nonetheless, this alone
dismisses the original idea of sharding, that is to improve
blockchain by parallelizing the consensus work and storage,
i.e., each validator only handles a disjoint subset of trans-
action. To avoid costly on-chain consensus on the output of
txshading, we need to execute the algorithm off-chain while
ensuring that the operation is tamper-proof in the presence of
malicious validators. To tackle this challenge, in this work, we
leverage the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to securely
execute the transaction sharding algorithm on the validators.
TEE in a computer system is realized as a module that
performs some verifiable executions in such a way that no
other applications, even the OS, can interfere. Simply speaking,
a TEE module is a trusted component within an untrusted
system. An important feature of TEE is the ability to issue
remote attestations which are digital signatures over the TEE’s
code and the execution’s output. These signatures are signed
by the private keys that are known only by the TEE hardware.
Intel SGX [12] is a good implementation of TEE in which
remote attestation is well-supported. However, TEE does not
offer satisfactory availability guarantees as the hardware could
be arbitrarily terminated by a malicious host or simply by
losing power.
In this work, our goal is to use TEE as a computing unit
installed in the validators that assists the clients in determining
the transactions’ output shard with an attestation to prove the
correctness of execution. Our overall concept of using TEE as
a countermeasure for the attack is as follows:
• Validators are equipped with TEE modules (most
modern Intel CPUs from 2014 support Intel SGX). A
transaction sharding algorithm such as OptChain [5]
is installed in the TEE module.
• When a client issues a transaction to a validator, the
validator will run its TEE module to get the output
shard of that transaction, together with an attestation
to prove the code’s integrity as well as the correctness
of the execution.
• The client can verify the computation using the at-
testation and then send the transaction together with
the attestation to the blockchain system in the same
manner as issuing an ordinary transaction.
• The blockchain validators upon receiving that data
from the client verify the attestation before relaying
the transaction to input and output shards.
With this concept, we can rest assure that an attacker cannot
manipulate transactions to overwhelm a single shard. Addition-
ally, we do not need the whole blockchain validators to reach
consensus on a transaction’s output shard, this computation
is instead done off-chain by one or some small amount of
validators. However, there are some technical challenges when
using TEE in an untrusted network:
• A malicious validator can terminate the TEE as its
discretion, which results in losing its state. The TEE
module must be designed to tolerate such failure.
• Although the computation inside the TEE is trusted
and verifiable via attestation, a malicious validator can
deceive the TEE module by feeding it with fraud data.
To overcome these challenges, we aim to design a state-
less TEE module where any persistent state is stored in the
blockchain. To obtain the state from the blockchain, the TEE
module acts as a blockchain client to query the block headers
from the blockchain, thereby ensuring the correctness of the
data (this is how we can exploit the immutability of blockchain
to overcome pitfalls of TEE modules). With this design, even
when some TEE modules are arbitrarily shut down, the security
properties of the protocol are not affected.
A. System Overview and Security Goals
In this section, we present an overview of our system for
the countermeasure and establish some security goals.
1) System overview: Our system considers two types of
entities: clients and validators
• Clients are the end-users of the system who are
responsible for generating transactions. The clients are
not required to be equipped with a TEE-enabled plat-
form. In fact, the clients in our system are extremely
lightweight.
• Validators in each shard maintain a distributed append-
only ledger, i.e. a blockchain, of that shard with
an intra-shard consens protocol. Validators require a
TEE-enabled platform to run the transaction sharding
algorithm.
For simplicity, we assume that a client has a list of TEE-
enabled validators and it can send requests to multiple valida-
tors to tolerate certain failures. Each TEE-enabled validator has
txsharding installed in its TEE module. We also assume that
the TEE module in each of the validators constantly monitors
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Fig. 10. System overview
the blockchain from each shard, so that it always has the latest
state of the shards.
Denoting ENCk(m) as the encryption of message m under
key k and DECk(c) as the decryption of ciphertext c under key
k, the steps for computing the output shard for a transaction
is as follows (Fig. 10):
1) Client C sends the transaction tx to a TEE-enabled
validators. C obtains the public key pkTEE of a
validator, computes inp = ENCpkTEE (tx), and
sends inp to the validator.
2) The validator loads inp into its TEE module and
starts the execution of txsharding in TEE.
3) The TEE decrypts the inp using its private key, and
executes the txsharding using tx and the current
state st of the blockchain. Then, the output Sout
is generated together with the state st upon which
Sout is determined, and a signature σTEE proving
the correct execution.
4) The validator then send (Sout, st, σTEE , htx) to C
where htx is the hash of the transaction. C verifies
σTEE before sending (σTEE , tx) to the blockchain
network for final validation. If C sends request to
more than one validator, C would choose the Sout
that reflects the latest state.
Note that C could choose an outdated Sout, however,
other entities can validate if a pair (Sout, st) is indeed
the output of a TEE. The blockchain system can
simply reject transactions whose Sout was computed
based on an outdated st
5) Upon receiving (σTEE , tx), the validators again ver-
ify σTEE before proceeding with relaying and pro-
cessing the transaction.
In practice, TEE platforms like Intel SGX performs the
remote attestation as follows. The attestation for a correct
computation takes the form of a signature pi from the output of
TEE. Suppose Intel SGX is the implementation of TEE and the
execution on TEE results in an output Sout and an attestation
σTEE , as indicated in [17], the validator sends σTEE to the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS) provided by Intel. Then IAS
verifies σTEE and replies with pi = (b, σTEE , σIAS), where b
indicates whether σTEE is valid or not, and σIAS is a signature
over b and σTEE by the IAS. Since pi is basically a signature,
it can be verified without using TEE or having to contact the
IAS.
2) Adversarial model and Security goals: In the threat
model in Section III-A, the attacker only plays the role of
a client, however, we stress that the countermeasure must
not violate the adversarial model of blockchain, which is
working with malicious validators. Thus, in designing the
countermeasure system, we extend the previous threat model
as follows.
In the same manner as previous work on TEE-enabled
blockchain [16], [17], we consider an adversary who controls
the operating system and any other high-privilege software on
the validators. Attackers may drop, interfere, or send arbitrary
messages at any time during execution. We assume that the
adversary cannot break the hardware security enforcement
of TEE. The adversary cannot access processor-specific keys
(e.g., attestation and sealing key) and it cannot access TEE’s
memory that is encrypted and integrity-protected by the CPU.
The adversary can also corrupt an abitrary number of
clients. Clients are lightweight, they only send requests to
the validator the get the output shard of a transaction. They
can verify the computation without TEE. We assume honest
clients trust their platforms and softwares, but not that of
others. We consider that the blockchain will perform prescribed
computation correctly and is always available.
With respect to the adversarial model, we define the
security notions of interest as follows:
1) Correct execution: the output of a TEE module must
reflect the correct execution of txsharding with
respect to inputs tx and st, despite malicious host.
2) The system is secure against the aforementioned
single-shard flooding attack.
3) Stateless TEE: the TEE module does not need to
retain information regarding previous states or com-
putation.
3) Blockchain sharding configuration: For an ease of pre-
sentation, we assume a sharding system that resembles the
OmniLedger blockchain [3]. Suppose the sharding system has
n shards, for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, we denote BCi and BHi as
the whole ledger and block headers of shard Si, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that each shard Si keeps track of
its UTXO database, denoted by Ui. Given a shard Si, each
validator in Si monitors the following database: BCi, BHj 6=i,
and U1,2,...,n.
As we use an Omniledger-like blockchain, each shard
elects a leader who is responsible for accepting new transaction
to the shard. For simplicity, we consider that the sharding sys-
tem provides an API validate(tx) that takes a transaction tx
as the input and performs the transaction validation mechanism
on tx. validate(tx) returns true if tx is successfully committed
to the blockchain, otherwise it returns false.
Additionally, we consider the system uses a signature
scheme Σ(G,Sig, V f) that is assumed to be EU-CMA secure
(Existential Unforgeability under a Chosen Message Attack).
ECDSA is a suitable signature scheme in practice [20]. More-
over, the hash function H(·) used by the system is also
assumed to be collision resistant: there exists no efficient algo-
rithm that can find two inputs a 6= b such that H(a) = H(b).
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Functionality Fblockchain
Store DB = {DBi|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}}, each DBi is an
appended database indexed by htx.
• On input read(id, htx) from Pi: return DBid[htx] or
⊥ if not exists.
• On input write(id, tx) from Pi:
1) If validate(tx) = 0 then output reject().
2) Otherwise, DBid = DBid ‖ tx and output
accept()
Fig. 11. Ideal blockchain Fblockchain
Functionality FTEE
• On initialization
◦ Generate (pkTEE , skTEE)
• On input install(prog) from Pk:
◦ if prog is not stored then store(prog)
• On input resume(inpc) from Pk:
1) If prog is not stored than return ⊥.
2) outp = prog(inpc)
3) σ = Σ.Sig(skTEE , (prog, outp))
4) Return (σ, outp) to Pk
Fig. 12. Ideal TEE FTEE
Finally, we assume that each TEE generates a public/secret
key-pair and the public key is publicly available to all entities
in the network. In practice, the public keys could be stored in
a global identity blockchain.
B. Modeling Functionality of Blockchain and TEE
We specify the ideal blockchain Fblockchain as an appended
decentralized database as in Fig. 11. Fblockchain stores DB =
{DBi|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}} which represents a set of blockchains
that are hold by shard 1, 2, ..., n, respectively. Each blockchain
DBi is indexed by the transactions’ hash value htx. We assume
that by writing to the blockchain of a shard, all validators of
the shard reach consensus on that operation.
We also specify the ideal TEE FTEE that models a TEE
module in Fig. 12, following the formal abstraction in [21]. On
startup, FTEE generates a public/secret key pair, and only the
public key is accessible by other parties. With the public key,
other entities in the network are able to verify messages signed
by FTEE’s secret key. This represents the attestation service in
a TEE-enabled platform. A TEE module is an isolated software
container that is installed with a program that, in this work,
is a transaction sharding algorithm. FTEE abstracts a TEE
module as a trusted third party for confidentiality, execution,
and authenticity with respect to any entities that is a part of
the system. prog is a program that is installed to run in a TEE
module; the input and output of prog are denoted by inp and
outp, respectively.
On initialization, the TEE module needs to download and
monitor Ui for i ∈ 1, 2, .., n. These data are encrypted using
the TEE’s secret key and then stored in the host storage,
Program prog run in the TEE module
Input: inpc
1) Request the current state st from the sealed database
2) tx← DECskTEE (inpc)
3) Sout = txsharding(tx, st)
4) Return (Sout, st,H(tx))
Fig. 13. Program prog run in the TEE module
which is also referred as sealing. By this way, the TEE will
make sure that its data on the secondary storage cannot be
tampered with by a malicious host. To ensure that the TEE
always uses the latest version of the sealed UTXO database,
rollback-protection systems such as ROTE [22] can be used.
Fig. 13 defines the program prog that is installed in
the TEE module to be used in this work. As can be seen,
the program decrypts the encrypted input inpc using the
secret key skTEE . txsharding is implemented inside prog
to securely execute the transaction sharding algorithm. The
program returns the output shard Sout, the state st upon which
Sout was computed, and the hash of the transaction htx. This
hash value is used to prevent malicious hosts from feeding the
TEE module with fake transactions, which will be discussed
in more detail in the next subsection.
Upon running prog with the input inpc, the TEE module
obtains the signature σTEE over the output of prog and the
code of prog using its private key. Finally, the TEE module
returns to the host validator σTEE , and the output outp from
prog.
C. Formal Specification of the Protocol
Our proposed system supports two main APIs for the end-
users: (1) newtx(tx) handles the secure computation of a
transaction tx, and (2) read(id, htx) returns the transaction
that has the hash value htx from shard id.
The protocol for validators is formally defined in Fig. 14,
which relies on FTEE and Fblockchain. The validator ac-
cepts two function calls from the clients: request(txc) and
process(Sout, σTEE , tx). request(txc) takes as input a trans-
action that is encrypted by the public key of TEE and send
txc to the TEE module. For simplicity, we assume that the
validator is TEE-enabled, if not, the validator simply discards
the request(txc) function call. Since txc is encrypted by
pkTEE , a malicious host cannot tamper with the transaction.
The validator waits until the TEE returns an output and relays
that output to the function’s caller.
Note that as the output of the TEE includes the transaction’s
hash htx, the client can check that the TEE indeed processed
the correct transaction tx originated from the client. This is
possible because of the end-to-end encryption of tx between
the client and the TEE. Furthermore, since σTEE protects
the integrity of Sout, the client can verify that Sout was not
modified by a malicious validator.
The function process(Sout, σTEE , tx) receives as input the
transaction tx, σTEE , and output shard Sout of tx. The val-
idator also verifies σTEE before making a call to Fblockchain
to start the transaction validation for tx.
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Protocol for validators
• On input request(txc) from Ci:
1) Send resume(txc) to FTEE
2) Wait to receive (σTEE , (Sout, st, htx)) from
FTEE
3) Return (st, Sout, σTEE , htx)
• On input process(Sout, σTEE , tx) from Ci:
1) Assert σTEE is valid, if failed then return ⊥
2) Send write(Sout, tx) to Fblockchain
3) Wait to receive output from Fblockchain
4) Return the received output to Ci
Fig. 14. Protocol for validators
Protocol for clients
• On input newtx(tx) from environment Z:
1) txc ← ENCpkTEE (tx)
2) Send request(txc) to validator Pk
3) Receive (st, Sout, σTEE , htx)
4) Assert H(tx) = htx
5) Assert σTEE using
(st, Sout, txsharding,H(tx)), if fail then
return ⊥
6) Send process(Sout, σTEE , tx) to Sout
7) Wait to receive accept() or ⊥ from Pk
8) Forward the received data to Z
• On input read(id, idx) from environment Z:
1) Send read(idx) to Fblockchain[id] and relay
output to Z
Fig. 15. Protocol for clients
Fig. 15 illustrates the protocol for the clients. To determine
the output shard of a transaction tx, a client invokes the
API newtx(tx). First, to ensure the integrity of tx, the client
encrypts tx using the pkTEE and send txc to a TEE-enabled
validator Pk. Upon receiving (st, Sout, σTEE , htx) from Pk,
the client checks if the hash of tx is equal to htx. This prevents
a malicious validator from feeding a fake transaction to the
TEE module to manipulate Sout. The client also verifies if
the attestation σTEE is correct. Afterwards, the client sends
the transaction together with Sout and the attestation to the
validators of the transaction’s input and output shards for final
validation. newtx(tx) finally outputs any data received from
the validators. The API read(id, htx) can be called when the
client wants to obtain the transaction information from the
blockchain. The function also returns any data received from
Fblockchain.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
This section presents a detail security analysis of the
proposed countermeasure under the UC-model and evaluate
the performance of the proof-of-concept implementation.
A. Security Analysis
We first prove that the proposed protocol (1) only requires
a stateless TEE and (2) is secure against the single-shard
flooding attack, and then prove the correct execution security.
By design, the txsharding installed in the TEE base solely
on the transaction tx, and the state st of the blockchain for
computation. As tx is the input and st can be obtained by
querying from the UTXO database, the TEE does not need to
keep any previous states and computation, thus, it is stateless.
When the system makes decision on the output shard of
a transaction, it relies on the txsharding program which is
assumed to not base its calculation on transactions’ hash value.
Therefore, as txsharding also balances the load among the
shards, no attackers can manipulate transactions to overwhelm
a single shard, hence, the countermeasure is secure against the
single-shard flooding attack.
The correct execution security of our system is proven in
the Universal Composability (UC) framework [23]. We refer
the readers to Appendix A for our proof.
B. Performance Evaluation
This section presents our proof-of-concept implementation
as well as some experiments to evalute its performance. As
our countermeasure is immune to the single-shard flooding
attack, our goal is to evaluate the overhead of integrating this
solution to sharding. We implement the proof-of-concept using
Intel SGX that is available on most modern Intel CPUs. With
SGX, each implementation of the TEE module is referred
as an enclave. The proof-of-concept was developed on Linux
machines in which we use the Linux Intel SGX SDK 2.1 for
development. We implement and test the protocol for validators
using a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7-6700, 16GB
RAM, and an SSD drive.
As we want to demonstrate the practicality of the counter-
measure, the focus of this evaluation is three-fold: processing
time, communication cost, and storage. The processing time
includes the time needed for the enclave to monitor the
block headers as well as to determine the output shard of
a transaction requested by a client. The communication cost
represents the network overhead incurred by the interaction
between clients and validators to determine the output shards.
Additionally, we measure the amount of storage needed when
running the enclave.
In our proof-of-concept implementation, we use OptChain
[5] as txsharding. As OptChain determines the output shard
based on the transaction’s inputs, when obtaining the state from
the UTXO database, we only need to load those transaction’s
inputs from the database. Our proof-of-concept uses Bitcoin as
the blockchain platform, and the enclave is connected to the
Bitcoin mainnet.
1) Processing time: We calculate the processing time for
determining the output shard by invoking the enclave with 10
million Bitcoin transactions (encrypted with the TEE public
key) and measure the time needed to receive output from the
enclave. This latency includes (1) decrypting the transaction,
(2) obtaining the latest state from the UTXO database in the
host storage and (3) running txsharding. We observe that
the highest latency recorded is only about 214 ms and it also
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does not vary much when running with different transactions.
Consider that the average latency of processing a transaction
in sharding is about 10 seconds [5], our countermeasure only
imposes an additional 0.2 seconds for determining the output
shard.
For a detail observation, we measure the latency separately
for each stage. The running time of txsharding is negligible
as the highest running time recorded is about 0.13 ms when
processing a 10-input transaction at 16 shards. Decrypting the
transaction is about 0.579 ms when using 2048-bit RSA, and
a query to the UTXO database to fetch the current state takes
about 213.2 ms. Hence, fetching the state from the UTXO
database dominates the running time due to the fact that the
database is stored in the host storage.
Another processing time that we take into consideration
is the time needed for updating the UTXO database when
a new block is added to the blockchain. With an average
number of 2000 transactions per block, each update takes
about 65.7 seconds. However, this latency does not affect the
performance of the system since we can set up two different
enclaves running in parallel, one for running txsharding, one
for monitoring the UTXO database. Therefore, the time needed
to run txsharding is independent from updating the database.
2) Communication cost: Our countermeasure imposes
some communication overhead over hash-based transaction
sharding since the client has to communicate with the val-
idator to determine the output shard. In specific, the overhead
includes sending the encrypted transaction to the validator and
receiving response. The response comprises the state (repre-
sented as the block number), output shard id, attestation, and
a hash value of the transation. The communication overhead
sum up to about 601 bytes needed for the client to get the
output shard of a transaction. If we consider a communication
bandwidth of 10 Mbps, the transmission time would take less
than half a millisecond.
3) Storage: According to the proposed system for the
countermeasure, the enclave needs to store the UTXO database
in the host storage, which is essentially the storage of the
validator. As of Feb 2020, the size of Bitcoin’s UTXO set
is about 3.67 GB [24], which means that an additional 3.67
GB is needed in the validator’s storage. However, considering
that the validator’s storage is large enough to store the whole
ledger, which is about 263 GB as of Feb 2020 [25], the extra
data trivially accounts for 1.4%.
4) Summary: By evaluating a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of our countermeasure, the result in this section shows
that our system imposes negligible overhead with compared
to the hash-based transaction sharding, which is susceptible
to the single-shard flooding attack. Particularly, by incurring
insignificant processing time, communication cost, and storage,
our proposed countermeasure demonstrate the practicality as
it can be integrated to existing sharding solutions without
affecting the system performance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have identified a new attack in existing
sharding solutions. Due to the use of hash-based transaction
sharding, an attacker can manipulate the hash value of a
transaction to conduct the single-shard flooding attack, which
is essentially a DoS attack that can overwhelm one shard
with an excessive amount of transactions. We have thoroughly
investigated the attack with multiple analysis and experiments
to illustrate its damage and practicality. Most importantly, our
work has shown that by overwhelming a single shard, the
attack creates a cascading effect that reduce the performance
of the whole system.
We have also proposed a countermeasure based on TEE
that efficiently eliminate the single-shard flooding attack. The
security properties of the countermeasure have been proven in
the UC framework. Finally, with a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation, we have demonstrated that our countermeasure imposes
neligible overhead and can be integrated to existing sharding
solutions.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Luu, V. Narayanan, C. Zheng, K. Baweja, S. Gilbert, and P. Saxena,
“A secure sharding protocol for open blockchains,” in Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 17–30.
[2] M. Zamani, M. Movahedi, and M. Raykova, “Rapidchain: Scaling
blockchain via full sharding,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2018,
pp. 931–948.
[3] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, E. Syta, and
B. Ford, “Omniledger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via
sharding,” in 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
IEEE, 2018, pp. 583–598.
[4] J. Wang and H. Wang, “Monoxide: Scale out blockchains with asyn-
chronous consensus zones,” in 16th {USENIX} Symposium on Net-
worked Systems Design and Implementation ({NSDI} 19), 2019, pp.
95–112.
[5] L. N. Nguyen, T. D. Nguyen, T. N. Dinh, and M. T. Thai, “Optchain:
optimal transactions placement for scalable blockchain sharding,” in
2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems (ICDCS). IEEE, 2019, pp. 525–535.
[6] Ethereum, “ethereum/sharding.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
ethereum/sharding/blob/develop/docs/doc.md
[7] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[8] “700 million stuck in 115,000 unconfirmed bitcoin transactions,”
Nov 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.ccn.com/700-million-
stuck-115000-unconfirmed-bitcoin-transactions/
[9] “Report: Bitcoin (btc) mempool shows backlogged transac-
tions, increased fees if so?” June 2018. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/report-bitcoin-btc-mempool-
shows-backlogged-transactions-increased-fees-if-so/
[10] M. Saad, L. Njilla, C. Kamhoua, J. Kim, D. Nyang, and A. Mohaisen,
“Mempool optimization for defending against ddos attacks in pow-
based blockchain systems,” in 2019 IEEE International Conference on
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC). IEEE, 2019, pp. 285–292.
[11] K. Baqer, D. Y. Huang, D. McCoy, and N. Weaver, “Stressing out:
Bitcoin âA˘IJstress testingâA˘I˙,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2016, pp. 3–18.
[12] R. Intel, “Software guard extensions programming reference,” Intel
Corporation, 2014.
[13] A. Ltd, “Layered security for your next soc.” [Online]. Available:
https://www.arm.com/products/silicon-ip-security
[14] K. Team, “Keystone.” [Online]. Available: https://keystone-enclave.org/
[15] S. Matetic, K. Wüst, M. Schneider, K. Kostiainen, G. Karame, and
S. Capkun, “{BITE}: Bitcoin lightweight client privacy using trusted
execution,” in 28th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Secu-
rity 19), 2019, pp. 783–800.
12
[16] J. Lind, O. Naor, I. Eyal, F. Kelbert, E. G. Sirer, and P. Pietzuch,
“Teechain: a secure payment network with asynchronous blockchain
access,” in Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles, 2019, pp. 63–79.
[17] R. Cheng, F. Zhang, J. Kos, W. He, N. Hynes, N. Johnson, A. Juels,
A. Miller, and D. Song, “Ekiden: A platform for confidentiality-
preserving, trustworthy, and performant smart contracts,” in 2019 IEEE
European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE,
2019, pp. 185–200.
[18] P. Das, L. Eckey, T. Frassetto, D. Gens, K. Hostáková, P. Jauernig,
S. Faust, and A.-R. Sadeghi, “Fastkitten: practical smart contracts on
bitcoin,” in 28th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security
19), 2019, pp. 801–818.
[19] Y. Aoki, K. Otsuki, T. Kaneko, R. Banno, and K. Shudo, “Simblock:
A blockchain network simulator,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WK-
SHPS), April 2019, pp. 325–329.
[20] D. Johnson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, “The elliptic curve digi-
tal signature algorithm (ecdsa),” International journal of information
security, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 36–63, 2001.
[21] R. Pass, E. Shi, and F. Tramer, “Formal abstractions for attested
execution secure processors,” in Annual International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer,
2017, pp. 260–289.
[22] S. Matetic, M. Ahmed, K. Kostiainen, A. Dhar, D. Sommer, A. Gervais,
A. Juels, and S. Capkun, “{ROTE}: Rollback protection for trusted ex-
ecution,” in 26th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security
17), 2017, pp. 1289–1306.
[23] R. Canetti, “Universally composable security: A new paradigm for
cryptographic protocols,” in Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Con-
ference on Cluster Computing. IEEE, 2001, pp. 136–145.
[24] “Satoshi - unspent transaction output set,” Feb 2020. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://statoshi.info/dashboard/db/unspent-transaction-output-set
[25] “Blockchain size,” Feb 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.
blockchain.com/en/charts/blocks-size
13
Fcm: Ideal functionality of the countermeasure
• On Initialization:
1) DBi = ∅,∀i ∈ [N ]
• On input newtx(tx) from any party Pi:
1) relay input to A
2) Request current state st from the UTXO
database
3) Sout = txsharding(tx, st)
4) DBSout = DBSout ||tx
5) Send delayed accept() to Pi
• On input read(id, htx) from any party Pi:
1) If DBid[htx] is not available then return ⊥
2) Otherwise, return DBid[htx]
Fig. 16. Ideal functionality of the countermeasure
APPENDIX
A. Proof of correct execution in the UC framework
In the UC framework, a real world involves parties running
the proposed protocol, namely Πcm. On the other hand, an
ideal world consists of parties that interact with an ideal
functionality Fcm, a trusted third party that implements the
APIs of the proposed protocol, i.e., newtx(·) and read(·).
Fig. 16 shows the definition of Fcm. Any adversary A in the
real world is introduced in the ideal world by a simulator S
with an adversary model defined in Section V-A2.
To prove that the proposed protocol Πcm achieves correct
execution security, we show that: (1) Fcm achieves the correct
execution security in the ideal world; and (2) the real and
ideal worlds are indistinguishable to an external environment
Z . This implies that any attack violating security goals in the
real world is translatable to a corresponding attack in the ideal
one. This proves that the real world protocol also achieves the
correct execution security.
In Fcm, whenever a party triggers newtx(tx) with a
transaction tx, the execution of txsharding is performed
internally by the ideal functionality Fcm based on tx and the
current state st to determine Sout. Since Fcm is trusted under
UC, txsharding is guaranteed to be correctly executed. Fur-
thermore, Fcm also validates the transaction in the blockchain
and returns only accept() or ⊥ to the party, an adversary
does not have control over the output shard Sout, hence, the
adversary cannot tamper with Sout. Therefore, Fcm achieves
correct execution security.
Let A be an adversary against the proposed protocol. Per
Canetti [23], we say that Πcm UC-realizes Fcm if there exists
a simulator S, such that any environment Z cannot distinguish
between interacting with the adversary A and Πcm or with the
simulator S and the ideal functionality Fcm. By that definition,
we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The protocol Πcm in the (FTEE ,Fblockchain)
hybrid model UC-realizes the ideal functionality Fcm.
Proof: We prove the indistinguishability between the real
and ideal worlds through a series of hybrid steps as commonly
done in previous work [16], [17]. These hybrid steps start at H0
- the real-world execution of Πcm in the (FTEE ,Fblockchain)
hybrid model, and finally becomes the execution in the ideal
world. The indistinguishability is proven in each step.
Hybrid H0 is the real-world execution where parties run
Πcm in the (FTEE ,Fblockchain) hybrid model.
Hybrid H1 behaves in the same manner as H0, except
that S emulates FTEE and Fblockchain. First, S generates a
key pair (pkTEE , skTEE) and publishes pkTEE . Whenever A
interacts with FTEE , S records messages sent by A and em-
ulates FTEEâA˘Z´s behavior. Likewise, S emulates Fblockchain
by storingDB internally. As the view of A in H1 is identically
simulated in H0, Z cannot distinguish between H1 and the
execution H0.
Hybrid H2 proceeds as H1. However, every time
A communicates with Fblockchain, S identically emulates
FblockchainâA˘Z´s behavior for A. As the view of A in H2 are
simulated when interacting with the ledger, then environment
Z cannot distinguish between H2 and H1.
Hybrid H3 modifies H2 as follows. WhenA triggers FTEE
with a message install(prog), S records a tuple (σTEE , outp)
for all subsequent resume(·) calls, where outp is the output of
prog and σTEE is an attestation under skTEE over outp and
prog. S keeps a set of all such tuples. Whenever A sends
a tuple (σTEE , outp) that has not been recorded by S to
Fblockchain or an honest party, S simply stops the execution.
We can prove that Z cannot distinguish between H3 and
H2 as follows. In H2, if A sends forged attestations/signatures
to Fblockchain or an honest party, signature verification by
Fblockchain or the honest party will fail with negligible prob-
ability (as we assume the signature scheme Σ is EU-CMA
secure). If Z can distinguish H2 from H3, we can construct
an adversary using Z and A to win the game of signature
forgery.
Hybrid H4 proceeds as H3 with one modification: S
emulates the new transaction processing. In specific, honest
parties send newtx to Fcm. S emulates messages from FTEE
and Fblockchain as in H3, i.e., recording tuples (σTEE , outp).
If the party is corrupted, S sends newtx(tx) to Fcm as Pi. It
can be seen that the view of A is the same as in H2, as S can
identically emulate FTEE and Fblockchain.
It can be seen that H4 is identical to the ideal protocol.
In H4, while S interacts with Fcm, it emulates AâA˘Z´s view
of the real-world. Now, S only needs to output to Z what A
outputs in the real-world. Thus, there exists no environment Z
that can distinguish between interaction between A and Πcm,
from interaction between S and Fcm.
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